China's size limits its capacity to source further growth from exports and so the inevitable turn inward is in progress. Thus far, key home policy drivers have been fiscal expansion and public investment, though provincial indebtedness will constrain these in future and growth will be driven by the reform agenda, including further industrial reform and "internationalisation".
Introduction
The "East Asian" growth model has served both China and its trading partners well during the past three decades. It requires the transformation of lightly trained farmers into factory and service workers. The availability of these workers attracts capital from home and foreign saving to urban areas, raises the productivity of the transitioning workers and attracts further rural to urban migration. The snag is that the workers are not sufficiently well trained to support heavy manufacturing or sophisticated services and so production is highly specialised in light manufactures, relative to domestic demand. The transformation therefore requires considerable trade dependence. Moreover, in the East Asian experience, the resulting income growth has tended to outstrip perceived "permanent incomes" (Modigliani and Cao 2004) and so saving has been very high, causing current account surpluses. The domestic gains from the growth generated speak for themselves but trading partners have also gained, via both the product and financial terms of trade (Tyers 2014 ).
China's size and the slow growth of its trading partners now limit its capacity to source further growth from this model and so the inevitable turn inward is in progress. Thus far, the key elements in this transformation have been fiscal expansion and public investment, though provincial indebtedness will constrain these in future. China's government has therefore undertaken to identify reforms that will unleash further, necessarily inward, sources of growth.
These include further reforms of industry policy, trade policy, land ownership laws, the one child policy, fiscal federalism and taxation, financial market regulation, urbanisation (hukou) and capital account liberalisation under the general rubric of "internationalisation" (State Council 2014) . For most of these, change will be gradual and the short run implications slight.
For reforms to industrial policy and the capital account, however, short run effects on overall economic performance are likely to be significant. The approach adopted centres on an economy-wide model that takes explicit account of oligopoly behaviour in 17 industrial and service sectors. This model makes it possible to examine the interactions between industrial reform, regulatory policy and liberalisation of the capital account. The results suggest that industrial reform in heavy manufacturing and services has considerable potential, reducing costs and fostering growth in output, private consumption and modern sector employment. The effects of capital and financial account liberalisation are less certain and could be negative depending on whether there is demand for foreign assets that has been constrained by outward capital controls.
The next section reviews China's on-going transition, its causes and effects. In Section 3, the special structure of the Chinese economy is detailed along with a discussion of the special sensitivity of its employment performance to real exchange rate changes. Section 4 describes the model used and Section 5 then offers estimates of the effects of further inward growthgenerating further industrial reforms. Section 6 draws out the implications of the relaxation of capital controls and the associated changes in external flows. Conclusions are offered in Section 7.
China's Transition: A Motive for Key Reforms
Although China's rate of expansion during its three decades of reform has been spectacular, it is only in the last decade that its economic size has paralleled those of the US, the EU and Japan. China's exports have grown especially rapidly since the turn of the century and now dominate world trade in light manufactures.
1 As of 2011 its unadjusted share of global GDP was greater than Japan's and its shares of global exports, saving and investment were larger than those of the US and close to those of the EU (Table 1) . Looking forward, notwithstanding
China's comparative poverty on a per capita basis, there is not the scope for the rest of the world to absorb export growth from China at historical rates. Moreover, there has been an accelerated rise in Chinese labour costs, foreshadowing a Lewis "turning point" 2 , which is associated with the depletion of mobile labour in rural areas and a nation-wide demographic contraction stemming from China's one child policy.
Superficially, it would seem that a switch from export-oriented to inward-focussed growth is simply a matter of sustaining high investment and substituting consumption for exports. But this has been problematic because the growth to date has emphasised light manufacturing while China's growing middle class demands quality products and services that are as yet poorly represented in its production basket. To diversify China's output toward these products requires major reform of its heavy manufacturing and services sectors and investment in associated human capital. 3 This requires the extension of industrial reforms into hitherto protected heavy manufacturing and services industries, where reductions in costs and prices could have major stimulatory effects on the economy as a whole.
A key element of the global imbalance to which China has contributed is associated with its high saving. It has tended to produce more than it has consumed as its rapid growth has run ahead of its citizens' permanent incomes. The effect of this has been to confer on the rest of the world gains via both the product and financial terms of trade but also losses due to wage rigidity and labour displacement as well as distributional stress and structural adjustment costs (Tyers 2014) . A political backlash from the advanced economies has therefore also contributed to China's need for reforms that foster more inward-oriented growth. The proposed financial reforms, combined with the internationalisation of the Yuan, are directed not only at improving the efficiency with which the large stock of savings is directed into investment but also to the restoration of balance. For this reason the pattern and trends in China's saving and in its current account are indicators of its transition and of the need for its reforms.
Saving
National saving includes that by households, corporations and government. Savings that exceed the value of domestic private and public investment ("excess savings") result in the net acquisition of foreign assets and they are measured by the current account surplus:
Here S HH is household saving, S C is corporate saving, (T-G) is government saving or the fiscal surplus, S D is total domestic saving, I is investment (including public investment), ∆R is official foreign reserve accumulation, CA is the current account balance and N is net foreign factor income. 4 FI signifies foreign investment, inflows or outflows. In China's case these terms have traditionally been dominated by FDI since cross-border portfolio investments have been restricted by its capital controls (Ma and McCauley 2007) . Investment financing and the extent of imbalance therefore depends on household saving, corporate saving and government saving.
Household saving
China's households save between a quarter and a third of their disposable incomes, the pattern and time trend of which is analysed by Horioka and Wan (2007) and Horioka and TeradaHagiwara (2012 
Government saving
Since the implementation of China's national tax law in 1994, an increasing share of economic activity taking place in the "formal sector". This has meant that central government tax revenue has grown at a rate that is notably faster than GDP. 7 Along with this, central government financial surpluses have expanded continuously. At the provincial level, however, borrowing from domestic commercial banks by SOEs and local governments has been 5 If the weighted average of consumption-related retail and services sales growth is used to project the consumption share of GDP (Huang et al. 2012 ) the results suggest that the consumption share of GDP climbed from 49 to 54 per cent during 2008-2010, while China's NBS has it falling from 48 to 47 per cent. Huang et al. start with the official consumption share in 2000 and derive the GDP shares in remaining years using real GDP growth and their estimated consumption growth rates. Using similar data, Garner and Qiao (2013) suggest that Chinese consumption expenditure is officially underestimated by US$ 1.6 trillion, also concluding that its GDP share is expanding. 6 Opposing voices include Wei and Wen (2011) . Wei and Zhang identify a link between saving and entrepreneurship effort on the one hand and China's increasingly inflated sex ratio on the other. The coincidence of son preference and sexual selection technology has seen a rise in the number of unmatched men and increasingly competitive behaviour by families with sons. Debate continues about the strength of this force for higher saving against those associated with policy reforms in the education, health and retirement insurance industries. Wen, on the other hand, employs a model of rapid growth with constant proportional idiosyncratic risk, following Modigliani and Cao (2004) , to conclude that saving will continue to rise with income per capita. The assumption of constant proportional risk is a strong one, however, in the face of social reforms to health and retirement systems. 7 According to China's NBS Statistical Yearbook (2012) , central government revenue has expanded its share of nominal GDP from 10% in 1994 to 23% in 2012.
extensive and deficits have expanded dramatically. 8 After 2007, the sum of the provincial deficits exceeded the central surplus, leading to a return to overall deficits with magnitudes expanding to unprecedented levels ( Figure 1 ). Thus, government saving is also shifting in the negative direction in the post-GFC years and, as a consequence, there is little scope for the further use of government spending to balance the economy.
Current Account Balance
The above discussions lead us to expect a declining trend in China's total domestic saving rate even where this is not yet fully represented in the official statistics, which thus far show only a modest decline since 2010. Since then, however, total (private and public) investment has risen to nearly half of GDP. 9 The investment change has therefore been the primary driver of the declining trend in China's official current account surplus since 2010. Looking ahead, it is difficult to imagine a higher rate of both public and private investment without the prospect of increasingly wasteful projects (Singh et al. 2013) . Declines in household and corporate saving rates stemming from the combination of the proposed financial and industrial reforms are the least uncertain of the many likely consequences, suggesting further declines in the current account surplus.
Internationalisation and new roles for private financial flows:
The internationalisation reforms will make private flows on the capital and financial accounts
[the inward and outward private foreign investment terms in (1)] more influential. Eventually, it is expected that these will raise private holdings of foreign financial assets in both directions.
This has not happened yet, however, as Figure 2 confirms. Since the GFC, gross flows on China's balance of payments have fallen relative to its GDP and the most recent trends continue negative. This is a sign that the turn inward is under way and that there is reduced reliance on exports to generate new growth. At the same time, official statistics suggest that at least three quarters of the inflows and 90 per cent of the outflows are not in the FDI or portfolio investment categories, which include property investment. Since no long term trends are yet evident in these shares, significant weakening of China's capital controls remains in prospect and the traditional dominance of these flows by debt instruments continues.
8 See Zhang and Barnett (2014) . This is notwithstanding central government sharing of national revenue with the provinces at a 50-50 rate in 2011. 9 In the medium term, at least, this has confirmed the prediction by Lee and McKibbin (2007) that investment would contribute substantially to China's "rebalancing".
Yet expanded gross flows would seem inevitable. This raises the possibility that these flows could become unbalanced, favouring either inflows or outflows, due for example to pent-up demand for foreign assets that has heretofore been constrained by capital controls. The work of He and Luk (2013) does not foreshadow such unbalanced flows, nor does that of He et al. (2012) , which envisions a trend toward trade balance, offset in the current account by higher yields on foreign (newly private) holdings. Indeed, reasons why pent-up demand might not be a concern include that capital controls have been leaky enough for the wealthy to acquire the foreign assets they have wanted and that China's reserves are so large that they can be repatriated if private demand for foreign assets were to rise so that balance could be maintained for some years at levels desired by the government. Moreover, with widespread expectation that Balassa-Samuelson appreciations will continue as China grows relative to the advanced economies it is possible that there will be aversion to foreign assets along the lines seen in Japan, where private portfolio holders tolerate very low rates of return on home assets. A trend decline in China's saving rates and the absence of pent-up demand are therefore the reference circumstances under which capital account liberalisation might be expected to proceed.
It remains possible, however, that liberalisation could see a surge in outflows reflecting yet unobserved pent-up demand. Indeed, this prospect has come sharply into focus recently as private financial flows out of China have accelerated with the winding down of unconventional monetary policy in the US. The Yuan's appreciating trend has stalled and there is a temporary bolstering of Asian current accounts (Burns et al. 2014) . The possibility of a substantial Yuan depreciation as a consequence is considered by Eichengreen (2014) . The economic implications for China of these circumstances are therefore considered in Section 6.
Special Sensitivity to the Real Exchange Rate
The special sensitivity of China's economic performance to its real exchange rate stems from its economic structure, as summarised in Table 2 . Note that 1) the great majority of nonagricultural employment is in the export-oriented light manufacturing sector -indeed, employment in this sector exceeds that in agriculture, 2) this sector is relatively competitiveprice mark-ups are low and so pure or economic profits make up only a small share of total revenue, and 3) the SOE-dominated energy, metals and services sectors are less labourintensive and at the same time they are oligopolistic, generating substantial rents that form a buffer against downturns. These facts clearly suggest that total labour demand in China's modern sector is comparatively sensitive to the relativities between home wages and export prices, and hence to its real exchange rate.
The key sensitivities explored here are between China's real exchange rate and pricing behaviour in its oligopolistic heavy manufacturing and services industries on the one hand the openness of its capital account on the other. As indicated in the previous section, financial and industrial reforms are likely to continue the trend toward declining private saving. This will reduce the leakage of expenditure abroad, which in China has tended to take the form of foreign reserve accumulation. The result is that more Chinese expenditure falls on the home relative to the foreign economy and hence appreciating the real exchange rate. This has the effect of either inducing a home inflation or nominal appreciation of the Yuan. Either way, the trend will foster a shifting of economic activity from the export light manufacturing sector into heavy manufacturing and services.
But the scale of this effect will be sensitive to changes in oligopoly rents in a manner not commonly recognised. In essence, since the excess profits are achieved by supplying less output than would occur in competitive markets they reduce productivity in the largely nontraded sectors of the economy. Again employing the abstraction that goods and services are either tradable or not, the effect of this productivity contraction on relative prices is illustrated in Figure 4 . It raises the prices of non-traded goods relative to traded goods and hence China's real exchange rate. Further reforms to competition policy and regulatory practice that reduce these oligopoly rents would have the opposite effect and spur Chinese employment by sustaining the expansion in the labour-intensive and real-exchange-rate-sensitive light manufacturing sector. To quantify the effects of these changes on the real exchange rate and hence on China's economic performance, a more complete model of the Chinese economy is now introduced.
An Oligopoly Model of the Chinese Economy
We use a comparative static macroeconomic model of the Chinese economy that embodies a multi-industry structure in which all industries are treated as oligopolies, with firms in each industry supplying differentiated products and interacting on prices. 10 Government expenditure creates demands for goods and services via nested constant elasticity of 10 It is a distant descendant of that by Tyers (2005) , though it is considerably generalised to include interaction on prices and short run macroeconomic behaviour.
substitution (CES) preferences and government revenue stems from a tax system that includes both direct (income) taxes levied separately on labour and capital income and indirect taxes including those on consumption, imports and exports. 11 A capital goods sector is included which translates investment expenditure into product and service demands, again using a nested CES preference structure. The level of total investment expenditure has Q-like behaviour, being influenced positively by expected home rates of return on installed capital (which drive the market values of firms' assets) and negatively by a financing rate obtainable from an open "bond market" in which home and foreign bonds are differentiated to represent China's capital controls (the rates in which drive capital replacement costs). 12 Savings are sourced from the collective household at a constant rate and from corporations at industryspecific rates depending upon the magnitudes of pure (economic) profits earned. Foreign direct investment and official foreign reserve accumulation are both represented as per (1):
, to complete China's external financial accounts.
Model Structure
The scope of the model is detailed in Table 3 . oligopolists in their product markets they have no oligopsony power as purchasers of primary factors or intermediate inputs. 13 The economy modelled is "almost small", implying that it has no power to influence border prices of its imports but its exports are differentiated from competing products abroad and hence face finite-elastic demand. 14 The consumer price index is constructed as a composite Cobb-Douglas-CES index of post-consumption-tax home product and post-tariff import prices, derived from the aggregate household's expenditure function.
This formulation of the CPI aids in the analysis of welfare impacts. Because collective utility 11 Income taxes are approximated by flat rates deduced as the quotient of revenue and the tax base in each case. 12 In the lengths of run considered there is no steady state that would equate expected net rates of return with current bond yields. 13 Imports in each industrial category are seen as homogeneous, differentiated from home products as a group, so that import varietal diversity never changes. Since all home varieties are exported there is no movement on the "extensive margin" of the type that is evident in the models of non-homogeneous export industries by Melitz(2003) and Balistreri et al. (2007) . 14 The effective numeraire is the import product bundle. Consumer and GDP price indices are constructed for real aggregations, following the practice in national modelling since Dixon et al. (1982) and Harris (1984) .
is also defined as a Cobb-Douglas combination of the volumes of consumption by generic product, proportional changes in overall economic welfare correspond with those in real GNP.
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The quantity of domestically-owned physical capital is fixed in the short run, so that changes in the total capital stock affect the foreign ownership share and hence the level of income repatriated abroad. Long and short run closures can be adopted but the analysis presented herein is focussed on the short run: physical capital is fixed in supply and immobile between industries. Production labour is mobile between industries but at a fixed real (CPI-deflated)
wage, so that employment is endogenous, and the remaining factors, while also mobile between industries, are fixed in endowment and flexibly priced. There is no entry or exit of firms but the magnitudes of pure profits earned are endogenous. consistent with China's heretofore fiscal conservatism, the base fiscal position is held constant so that changes in endogenous revenue lead to corresponding changes in government expenditure.
Macroeconomic behaviour
As befits a comparative static analysis, the macroeconomics embodied is elemental. The short run closure fixes productive capital use in all industries but allows investment that would affect production in the future. Central is the open economy capital market which is built around the market clearing identity, a version of (1), above, in which inward and outward private financial flows are consolidated into "net foreign saving":
where r is the home real financing rate (bond yield), r* is the real yield on bonds abroad (the two being differentiated and so offering different yields), ˆe R e is the expected rate of appreciation of the real exchange rate and R ∆ is the annual addition to official foreign reserves. Total domestic saving is the sum of saving by households, corporations and government: P , is defined as a Cobb-Douglas index of prices, the equivalent variation in income can be expressed in terms of the proportional change in this index. Thus, following any shock, the income equivalent of the resulting changes to income and prices is, approximately, the proportional change in real GNP.
extraordinarily high level of corporate saving, C S , is assumed to stem only from pure profits, π , with a distinct but fixed saving rate calibrated separately for each industry:
The rate ce r is the expected average net rate of return on installed capital, which takes the following form at the industry level:
where K P is the current price of capital goods, Ye P is the product price level expected to prevail upon gestation and δ is the rate of depreciation. An average of the sector-specific rates, ce i r , is taken that is weighted by value added in each industry to obtain the economy-wide level ce r . Investment expenditure, I, is then determined by:
This relationship reflects the Q ratio in that ce r determines the current value of firms' capital while r determines its current replacement cost.
In our comparative static analysis net foreign saving, NF S , is motivated by changes in the level of an interest parity function that incorporates the difference between the home and foreign real bond yields and real exchange rate expectations. A linear relationship is used to allow for reversals of the direction of net flow in response to shocks. The model is essentially Walrasian in that shocks originating in saving and investment, and hence in external flows, cause home (relative to foreign) product prices (and hence the real exchange rate) to adjust sufficiently to clear home markets and preserve the balance of payments.
Short run effects in a real model
In the short run nominal wage rigidity is important and this is not readily represented in real models such as this one. We can contrast two extreme monetary targeting regimes: the fixed nominal exchange rate and the float with a GDP price target. With the fixed exchange rate regime, any change in the real exchange rate takes the form of a corresponding change in the domestic price level. If the nominal exchange rate, E, is defined as the number of units of foreign exchange obtained for a unit of the domestic currency, then the real exchange rate, R e , can be defined correspondingly as the rate of exchange between the home product bundle and corresponding bundles produced abroad. It follows that the real exchange rate can be approximated as the common currency ratio of the GDP prices of the two countries,
It is argued elsewhere (Tyers and Zhang 2011) , for example) that, under China's capital controls and given the high saving rate, the PBC had little residual discretion over annual increments to reserves. This is because there was no incentive for China's commercial banks to do other than relinquish unused foreign currency to the PBC. The scale of reserve accumulations were therefore not an instrument in the PBC's monetary policy. Equation (7) is intended merely as a reduced form description of this process. 17 As modelled, N comprises a fixed net private inflow of income from assets abroad and fixed aid to the government, less endogenous repatriated earnings from foreign-owned physical capital in China. and so, when E is targeted and there is no indirect effect on the foreign currency price level in the rest of the world, a real appreciation must take the form of an inflation:
If we then assume that our short run is sufficiently tight to render the nominal wage of production workers rigid, then the short run real wage movement mirrors the real appreciation:
↓ , so that ˆˆR w e = − . By contrast, a flexible exchange rate regime with a price level target would see no change in the price level or real wage but a nominal appreciation of magnitude equal to the proportional change in the real exchange rate.
The liberalisation of capital controls will require increased nominal exchange rate flexibility, as the "impossible trinity" dictates. While we always retain the real exchange rate as endogenous, both closures linking it to the price level and real wage rate are used in our experiments.
Oligopoly in supply
Firms in each industry supply differentiated products. They carry product-variety-specific fixed costs and interact on prices. Cobb-Douglas production drives variable costs so that average variable costs are constant if factor and intermediate product prices do not change but average total cost declines with output. Firms charge a mark-up over average variable cost which they choose strategically. Their capacity to push their price beyond their average variable costs without being undercut by existing competitors then determines the level of any pure profits and, in the long run, the potential for entry by new firms.
Thus, each firm in industry i is regarded as producing a unique variety of its product and it faces a downward-sloping demand curve with elasticity ε i (< 0). The optimal mark-up is then: Critically, export demand is more elastic than the others and final demand is more elastic than intermediate, government and investment demand. Thus, when shocks alter the distribution of the demand facing firms, the average elasticity faced is altered and so firms change their markups.
To study the effects of price-cap regulation on oligopoly pricing, a Ramsey mark-up, Table 2 , which shows that China's measured GDP is dominated by light manufacturing and services. The major contributors to exports are also those that export the largest shares of their output. The traded industries in general and the exporting light manufacturing industries in particular are intensive in production labour. This is most notably true of processed agricultural products and textiles.
Calibration of pure profits and oligopoly parameters
The flows represented in the database do not reveal details of intra-sectoral industrial structure.
To represent oligopolistic behaviour, additional information is required on effective firm numbers, pure profits, fixed costs and minimum efficient scale for each industry. With the support of China's official statistics these variables are calibrated in the following manner.
First, pure profits are required as a share of total revenue in each industry. This is needed to finalise the flow database by splitting capital payments between market and over-market returns. 21 It is also a starting point for calibrating industry competitive structure. Second, rough estimates are required of strategically interacting firm numbers in each industry and their 20 Documentation on the GTAP 6 Data Package may be viewed at: <http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/>. 21 Pure profit shares of total revenue in 2005were high in "metals and minerals", "petroleum and energy", "telecommunications", "insurance and finance" and "transport". Data on accounting profits in the latter three sectors is comparatively weak and the estimates are partly judgemental, accounting for such determinants as low borrowing rates for these SOE dominated sectors and hence low capital service costs. See the appendices to Tyers and Lu (2008 Table 4 it is evident that, where exports dominate demand firms face larger elasticities and charge smaller mark-ups. Consistent with these observations, pure profit shares of total revenue tend to be small or even negative for exportoriented industries and very large for the SOE dominated industries: petroleum, metals and minerals, telecommunications, finance and transport.
22 Effective firm numbers are smaller than totals since pricing is frequently dominated by a few large firms in each sector. For oligopolistic sectors in China, these tend to be state owned enterprises.. 23 Summaries of this literature are offered by Dimaranan and McDougall (2002) and at http://www.gtap. purdue.edu/databases/. 24 Note that the reason the elasticities appear large in magnitude at first glance is that they do not represent the slopes of industry demand curves for generic goods. Rather, they are the elasticities faced by suppliers of individual varieties and are made larger by inter-varietal substitution. 25 Fixed costs take the form of both physical and human capital costs using the rule of thumb (based on estimates by Harris and Cox, 1983) that physical capital has a fixed cost share of 5/6. 26 The actual calibration process is yet more complex than this because the elasticities of intermediate demand depend on intermediate cost shares, which depend on the variable cost share. It is therefore necessary to calibrate iteratively for consistency of elasticities and shares. 27 Export demand is found to be more elastic because of the larger number of substitutable product varieties available abroad while intermediate demand is relatively inelastic because of firms' reluctance to alter arrangements for intermediate input supply which may depend on location or "just in time" relationships. These issues are addressed empirically by Harris and Cox (1983) .
In model simulations, because the elasticities are tied to database flows via mark-ups and hence pure profits, it is difficult to alter them without rebuilding the entire database. In short run applications, where smaller elasticities are sensible, the export elasticities are shocked down within simulations. The short run applications presented here have export elasticities (in particular, the foreign elasticity of substitution between home and foreign products) shocked down by 70%. 28 Oligopoly pricing is assumed to focus on a longer run than simulated and so these reductions in the external elasticities do not drive home pricing decisions. They only represent external adjustment at a length of run that is shorter than firms' planning horizons.
Further Industrial Reform and Short Term Growth
China's industrial reforms have contributed substantially to its overall economic growth in the past two decades, and this includes its spectacular growth in non-agricultural employment.
The extension of these reforms into industries that have tended to be dominated by state-owned The package reduces the corporate saving rate by 10 per cent. This compares with a 70 per cent reduction that would bring the corporate saving level down to that prevailing in Taiwan and in many other advanced economies. The level of corporate saving is further reduced by additional reforms affecting the size of economic profits. The first of these is pricing surveillance, which is represented by a reduction in the conjectural variations parameters in all 28 For a discussion of elasticities and the length of run in comparative static analysis, see Cooper et al. (1985) . The analytics of short run changes to the responsiveness of export demand, see the accompanying appendix. 29 Direct productivity implications associated with take-over risk and access to FDI are ignored here, though they are considered in the long run analysis by Tyers (2013 ϕ is raised by 10 per cent, as per the discussion of (11) in Section 4).
The effects of this packaged shock are summarised in the first column of Table 5 , which shows them to be substantial, indeed sufficient by themselves to sustain China's historically high growth for several years. The cost reductions that follow from reduced oligopoly rents, particularly in key sectors supplying widely used intermediate goods and services, foster expansions in output and employment throughout the economy. Moreover, they depreciate the real exchange rate, thus fostering long run growth in exports. 31 Production is, on average, closer to minimum efficient scale and, even though oligopoly rents (pure profits) are reduced, average capital returns rise due to increased market rents on existing capital. The rise in these returns leads to increased investment expenditure that is financed by reduced net financial outflows in the form of reduced foreign reserve accumulation.
As to industry-specific effects, mark-ups and pure profits decline in most industries, and particularly in those with high initial rents. There is also a redistribution of the production labour force out of agriculture, processed agricultural products and textiles and into industries that benefit most from cost reductions. These are the less labour-intensive industries and they include metals, motor vehicles, other manufactures, finance and transport. Real wages of production workers are modestly higher and those of skilled workers very substantially higher so the additional output is smaller in those industries with highest labour intensity. Even considering the higher unit factor rewards, most industries enjoy reductions in unit fixed costs as production runs expand. These include metals, petrochemicals, motor vehicles, other manufactures, transport and construction. Finally, the composition of exports changes with increased concentration in metals and motor vehicles and there is an expanded external role for the Chinese transport services industry.
In aggregate, then, even though this package of reforms allows the retention of some potentially distorting oligopolies, it is attractive in that it raises modern sector employment and 30 For the analytics of this, see the mathematical appendix. 31 In these short run simulations the export elasticities are smaller than those motivating firms' pricing behaviour (Table 4) and so export growth is curtailed. It is nonetheless substantial in key sectors: mining, electronics, motor vehicles and other manufacturing, all of which enjoy export volume expansions of between three and 10 per cent.
productivity while restoring the prominence of consumption expenditure and further reducing the external imbalance. Moreover, it moves the structure of the economy away from its prior dependence on inexpensive raw labour toward a more mature phase in which China's services industries are larger and more competitive and the composition of its trade is more similar to that of most industrialised economies.
Capital Account Liberalisation
In Section 2 the empirical evidence to date is seen to suggest a trend decline in China's overall saving rate and it is noted that the studies available thus far do not suggest any significant pentup demand for rebalancing of private portfolios in favour of foreign assets. This implies a smooth transition to balanced further growth irrespective of the extent of capital account liberalisation. Here such a scenario is compared with one in which there is pent-up demand for foreign assets that causes an outward rebalancing following capital account liberalisation.
Thus, the experiments presented consider modest declines in saving rates on the one hand and a structural shift that reflects the release of pent-up demand for foreign assets on the other. In each case the effects are evaluated assuming either a monetary defence of the nominal exchange rate or a float. The results are summarised in Table 6 .
Consider first the effects of a smooth continuation of China's savings decline. This is represented by shocking the household and corporate saving rates down by 10 per cent. This tightens the home financial market and, with liberalised capital and financial accounts, it draws in private foreign investment. The effects of this are partially offset by reduced reserve accumulation. Nonetheless, the private inflow is sufficient to cut the current account surplus by half. Combined with the boost to domestic consumption expenditure that accompanies reduced saving rates, this new inflow raises demand for home relative to foreign products and services and so appreciates the real exchange rate.
If monetary policy targets the nominal exchange rate, as in the first column of Table 6 , this implies a domestic inflation and, with nominal wage rigidity, there is a substantial boost to production employment. Combined with new investment that is financed by the inflow and induced in part because greater employment raises capital returns, this leads to a substantial boost to real GDP growth. If the nominal exchange rate is allowed to appreciate the home inflation is avoided and much of the inducement to increase production employment disappears. Nonetheless, aggregate demand is still boosted by greater home consumption and the foreign private inflow and there is therefore a modest rise in real GDP. In both cases the increases in production runs boost industrial efficiency. But the increase in demand is internal and hence it reduces perceived elasticities and raises mark-ups in key industries, thereby raising oligopoly rents. Overall, however, capital account liberalisation might be expected to have marginally positive effects under these circumstances.
Now consider the possibility that there is considerable home demand for foreign assets that is constrained by China's outward capital controls. To represent the effects of this following the liberalisation of the capital and financial accounts an arbitrary shift is introduced in the constant term of (6), a SF (which is initially negative), that reduces net private inflow at all levels of the home bond yield. As the third column of Table 6 indicates, this shift is sufficient in the experiment to cause a private outflow amounting to about a fifth of GDP. Partially offset by a repatriation of foreign reserves, this shock also tightens the home financial market. This time, however, less investment is financed, it blows out the current account surplus and its effect on aggregate demand is therefore negative. The real exchange rate depreciates and, if monetary policy is directed to defend the nominal exchange rate, there is a deflation that exacerbates a significant shedding of production employment and a contraction in real GDP.
If the nominal exchange rate is allowed to float downward the results are less dire, as indicated in the final column of Table 6 . The private outflow still impairs investment financing and the current account still blows out but there is no deflation, and hence no contraction in production employment; and the slide in GDP is much reduced. Clearly, this suggests that any commitment to capital and financial account liberalisation should accompany a preparedness to allow the nominal exchange rate to adjust, particularly downward, so as to avoid deflation.
Interestingly, while the pent-up demand story is negative for China's growth, if the exchange rate is allowed to adjust to avoid deflation the costs are borne primarily by the wealthy.
Oligopoly rents decline significantly as does the overall rate of return on capital, yet employment of production workers expands and real skilled wages rise, as do rents on land and natural resources. Thus, with flexible monetary policy, even a substantial out-pouring of private flows such as this need not impair China's short term growth very much.
The only caveat to this conclusion is that the simulations ignore the possibility of a banking or wider financial crisis. Home yields rise by about 17 per cent, suggesting a collapse in asset values that could threaten major financial institutions. This would cause the temporary sequestration of existing physical capital and a potentially substantial loss of employment.
Conclusion
China's recent rapid growth and its current size limits its capacity to source further expansion from exports and so the inevitable turn inward is in progress, as suggested by declines in gross flows on its balance of payments relative to its GDP that have been persistent since the GFC.
The large current account surpluses of the boom period are closing, thus far primarily due to fiscal expansion and some associated public investment. Unfortunately, this option is being closed off in the short run by the need for reform of fiscal federalism in China, to resolve growing provincial indebtedness. The key reforms with positive short run implications focus on industrial policy and capital and financial account liberalisation under the general rubric of "internationalisation". The short run effects of these policy shocks are examined using a 17 sector model of the Chinese economy that takes explicit account of oligopoly behaviour and financial flows in the short run.
The results confirm that further fiscal expansions, even with large public investment components, will not contribute the major share of new growth, but industrial reform in heavy manufacturing and services would reduce costs and foster growth in output, private consumption and modern sector employment. Moreover, they would reduce external imbalance by curtailing corporate saving, cut distortionary oligopoly rents and increase production runs in previously inefficient industries, thus raising the productivity of existing physical capital and labour. At the same time, the anticipated trend toward reduced saving and increased private consumption would be rewarding under capital and financial account liberalisation since expanded home consumption demand would be supplemented by a greater inflow of private foreign investment, raising both employment and real GDP. Were pent-up demand for foreign assets to be revealed following further liberalisation, the resulting financial outflows would only be seriously damaging were monetary policy to attempt to defend the nominal exchange rate, or if declines in asset values were to precipitate a domestic financial crisis. Moreover, in the absence of financial disruption and with the cushioning effect of exchange rate flexibility, such temporary outflows are shown to be beneficial to Chinese employment and labour incomes, with temporary negative impacts falling on capita returns. Sources: National accounts data supply most of the elements though adjustments have been required to ensure that current accounts sum to zero globally, as do capital/financial accounts. The IMF-IFS database is the major source but there is frequent resort to national statistical databases. Dimaranan and McDougall (2002) , and an updating of the national data to 2005, as described in Tyers and Lu (2008) . -11.7 -3.1 -2.8 -4.7 1.27 a All these variables are endogenous in the model. Initial (base) values are provided here. In model simulations, because the elasticities are tied to database flows via mark-ups and hence pure profits, it is difficult to alter them without rebuilding the entire database. In short run applications, where smaller elasticities are sensible, the export elasticities are shocked down within simulations. The short run applications presented here have export elasticities shocked down by 70%. For a discussion of elasticities and the length of run in comparative static analysis, see Cooper et al. (1985) . b Industry mark-ups are the ratio of producer prices and average variable costs. Source: Model database, derived from Dimaranan and McDougall (2002) a These simulations use a short run closure in which numbers of firms are fixed and pure profits endogenous, physical capital is fixed at the sectoral level with rates of return endogenous and the real wage of production workers is adjusted opposite to the change in the real exchange rate (consistent with a fixed nominal exchange rate) with all labour mobile between sectors. The fiscal closure has the government deficit exogenous while revenue and expenditure are endogenous. It is assumed that there is no change in expectations over the real exchange rate. There is no Ricardian equivalence, and so the household and corporate saving rates are constant. b A combination of reforms is introduced simultaneously: 1) progress on further privatisation is indicated by a 10% reduction in the corporate saving rate, 2) oligopoly pricing is moderated via surveillance, which reduces the conjectural variations parameters in all industries by 10%, and 3) excess profits are limited directly by imposing price caps that remove 10% of the gap between output price and average total cost in all industries. c This is using the standard model with capital controls represented by elasticities of S NF and ΔR to the interest parity value of 0.2 and -10, respectively. The change in the real wage of production workers is equal and opposite to that of the real exchange rate, as discussed in the text. d Here the model is modified to represent a liberalised capital account and floating exchange rate with a GDP price target. The elasticities of S NF and ΔR to the interest parity value are 20 and -0.2, respectively, and the real wage of production workers is constant. Note, however, that these substantial parameter differences apply to marginal changes due to the fiscal policy shock only. The starting level of private inflow remains small and the rate of reserve accumulation is correspondingly large. e To facilitate welfare interpretation GNP is expressed relative to the consumer price index. f As a measure of collective output volume, GDP is expressed relative to the GDP price. g Measured relative to the home GDP price. h This is the proportional change in the level of total production, or low-skill, employment. i The rate of return on physical capital is here gross of depreciation and inclusive of pure economic profits. The percentage change in the rate is shown, rather than the difference in percentage or basis points. j This is the per cent change in the weighted average of the ratio of gross output to minimum efficient scale, measured across all industries. k This is the per cent change in the sum of all pure or economic profits across industries as a proportion of current GDP. Source: Simulations of the model described in the text. 
